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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IS CONTRARY TO LAW, 
NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS 
A. EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED SUBSEQUENT TO PETITIONER'S BASE 
PERIOD AND APPLICATION FOR BENEFITS CANNOT BE USED TO 
DENY BENEFITS TO PETITIONER 
Respondent has argued that INS1 actions to deport 
Petitioner disqualified Petitioner for unemployment benefits. 
Importantly for the Petitioner, INS took no action to deport 
him or act upon his application for immigrant status at any 
relevant time, either during Petitioner's base period (calendar 
year 1984) or before Petitioner's application for benefits 
(January 6, 1985). The factual matters alleged by Respondent 
which occurred subsequent to Petitioner's filing of his claim 
are irrelevant; they cannot be used to deny benefits to 
Petitioner. Petitioner was eligible for unemployment benefits 
under Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(k) at all relevant points in time. 
The after-the-fact information which Respondent presents is 
immaterial to a decision which should have been made on 
Petitioner's base period. 
Events subsequent to the time Petitioner applied for 
benefits do not affect the decision of this Court. As defined 
in Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845 (2nd Cir. 1977), an 
individual may be "permanently residing in the United States" 
even though his stay here "may be dissolved eventually at the 
instance either of the United States or of the individual." 
553 F.2d at 850. In this case, Petitioner is now a permanent 
resident of the United States. Yet, even if action taken by 
INS subsequent to Petitioner's application for unemployment 
benefits eventually were to result in the dissolution of 
Petitioner's permanent residence in this country under color of 
law, that dissolution would not occur without a determination of 
his immigration status by an immigration judge. 
This Court's decision in Antillon v. Dept. of Employment 
Security, 688 P.2d 455 (Utah 1984) buttresses Petitioner's 
argument that no action to remove him from the United States 
could occur prior to an adjudication of his case by an 
immigration judge. Accordingly, at all relevant times 
Petitioner was eligible to receive unemployment benefits as an 
alien "permanently residing in the United states under color of 
law11, and the facts of his case are indistinguishable from the 
facts which this Court reviewed in Antillon. 
B, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS ARE GUARANTEED 
IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS 
Respondent casts aspersions on Petitioner for requesting 
voluntary departure in lieu of deportation once his request for 
suspension of deportation was denied. It cannot be stressed 
too much or repeated too often that Petitioner's deportation 
hearings came after his base period and application for 
unemployment benefits. It is a standard practice for 
immigration attorneys, when requesting suspension of 
deportation, to request voluntary departure in the alternative. 
A request for voluntary departure is not a concession of 
deportability. 8 C.F.R. §242.17(e). The immigration judge 
granted Petitioner the right to voluntary departure. 
Petitioner went to Mexico for a few months, adjusted his status 
and that of his family to that of permanent U.S. residents, and 
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returned to Payson, Utah, where he and his family had 
previously purchased a house and currently reside. 
In any case where an alien requests suspension of 
deportation, deportation does not take place before a final 
decision is entered by an immigration judge, 8 C.F.R. §§243.1 
and 243,2; see also (R. 0131), Just as the arrest of a suspect 
is not tantamount to an adjudication of guilt, the initiation 
of deportation proceedings against an alien already in this 
country is not tantamount to a finding of deportability. 
Rather, 
an alien within the United States, unlike 
one applying for entry at the border, is 
entitled to the full benefits of 
procedural due process under the aegis of 
the Fifth Amendment, Consequently, 
expulsion can be ordered only in 
accordance with law and after a fair 
hearing. 
Gordon and Rosenfield Immigration Law and Procedure §5,5 
(1986), citing The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
The requirements of fair play and fair dealing embodied in the 
notion of due process are codified in Section 242(b) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC §1252(b) (1983). 
Therefore, the veracity of the order to show cause that INS 
brings against an alien will not be determined prior to an 
adjudication of the alien's case by an immigration judge, 
C. THE RELEVANT FACTS OF THE CASE ARE INDISTINGUISHABLE 
FROM THOSE OF ANTILLON 
Respondent has asserted that Petitioner did not contact 
INS voluntarily. Respondent points to no evidence to refute 
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Petitionees testimony that he did so through his attorney in 
1981 (R. 0121). Petitioner's testimony and the copies of the 
letter and INS Form G-28 (R. 0185, 86) sent by his lawyer to 
INS constitute the only evidence on this issue. 
Respondent has claimed summarily that the record 
demonstrates that the facts of Petitioner's case are 
distinguishable from those of Antillon. In fact, the record 
shows that, as in Antillon, the INS knew that Petitioner was in 
the United States (since he was under docket control), knew 
where Petitioner was living from documents filed with INS 
containing his address, and took no action to deport Petitioner 
or act on his application for immigrant status at any relevant 
time. 
D. "LEGAL AVAILABILITY" CANNOT BE READ INTO 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §35-4-4(C) 
In Antillon, 688 P.2d at 457, this Court stated that the 
eligibility of aliens for unemployment benefits is governed by 
Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(k) (1953 as amended). . Utah Code Ann. 
§35-4-4(c), which Respondent commends to this Court's 
attention, requires that claimants of unemployment benefits be 
available for and actively seeking work during each week for 
which they claim unemployment benefits. There is no mention of 
legal availability in the statute. Nor is there any indication 
in the record that the legislature intended legal availability 
to be a condition to be satisfied by aliens "permanently 
residing in the United States under color of law" within the 
ambit of §35-4-5(k). 
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Instead, Respondent attempts to read legal availability 
into §35-4-4(c). In Antillon, Respondent argued unsuccessfully 
that aliens must meet a requirement of legal availability in 
order to receive unemployment benefits- Antillon, Defendant's 
Brief at 10. Having lost the argument in Antillon, Respondent 
raises the legal availability issue again in the case at bar, 
this time in the guise of §35-4-4(c). The argument carries no 
more weight today than it did in Antillon. Legal availability 
is simply a non-issue in this case. 
The Antillon Court noted that: 
(t)he test in this case is not whether 
Antillon initially entered this country 
illegally or whether he was legally 
entitled to work, but whether he was here 
under color of law at the time he applied 
for benefits. 
688 P.2d at 458. Respondent is somewhat disingenuous in 
suggesting that legal availability was not an issue in 
Antillon. In Antillon, legal availability was not the test; it 
certainly was an issue, one which the Respondent itself raised 
and did not prevail upon. Under the authority of Antillon, 
legal availability is not the test in this case, and Respondent 
cannot read legal availability into Utah Code Ann. §35-4-4(c). 
E. AT ALL RELEVANT TIMES, PETITIONER WAS PERMANENTLY 
RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES 
Respondent has cited Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456 
(9th Cir. 1985), a case which indicated that an alien would not 
be considered to be permanently residing in this country unless 
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INS had specifically authorized that alien for permanent 
residence• However, under Utahfs statutory scheme there is a 
provision separate from the color of law provision that 
provides for those people who have been legally admitted by INS 
to reside and work in the United States. The color of law 
provision is separate and distinct from the provision dealing 
with lawfully admitted aliens: 
(k)(l) For any week in which the benefits 
are based upon services performed by an 
alien, unless the alien is an individual 
who has been lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence at the time the 
services were performed, was lawfully 
present for purposes of performing the 
services or, was permanently residing in 
the United States under color of law at 
the time the services were performed... 
Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(k)(emphasis added) 
Permanent residence is a matter of intent. The indicia 
for all relevant times show that Petitioner's intent has never 
been other than to reside in the United States permanently. He 
purchased a house, paid Utah taxes, possessed a Utah driver^s 
license, and otherwise showed that his intent was to 
permanently reside in the United States. Prior to oral 
argument, Petitioner will submit affidavits, with attachments, 
showing that he was a permanent resident at all relevant times. 
II. ANTILLON IS CONTROLLING 
A. THE DISCUSSION IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 
SUPPORTS THE DECISION IN ANTILLON 
Respondent has marshalled the language of the 
congressional debate surrounding the adoption of amendments to 
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the federal unemployment statute. Nevertheless, the 
legislative history does not affect the decision in Antillon or 
compel a decision contrary to Antillon in the case at bar. As 
noted in Respondent's Brief at 18, the Sisk Amendment provided: 
(14) compensation shall not be payable on 
the basis of services performed by an 
alien who was not lawfully admitted to 
the United States; 
This provision does not include the category of aliens who are 
"permanently residing in the United States under color of law." 
Antillon determined that Congress created three exceptions 
to the general rule denying benefits. The Sisk Amendment was 
modified to reflect three exceptions to those aliens "not 
lawfully admitted to the United States;": The semicolon after 
this phrase strengthens Antillon's interpretation of 
§35-4-5(k), as it suggests that exceptions will follow. The 
statutory construction applied by this Court in Antillon is 
bolstered by the Congressional Record debates relied on by 
Respondent. 
The Antillon opinion went on to find that Antillon was a 
member of one of the excepted class of aliens, that class 
"permanently residing in the United States under color of law." 
Petitioner likewise is a member of the same class of aliens. 
Adoption of the position urged by Respondent would have the 
effect of judicially implementing the language of the Sisk 
Amendment without the subsequent modifications which provided 
three exceptions to the general rule. 
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B. ANTILLON'S COLOR OF LAW ANALYSIS 
IS STILL VALID 
Antillon grounded its analysis of the term "under color of 
law,f in the definition applied by the Second Circuit in Hoi ley 
v. Layine, 553 F.2d 845 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert, denied sub nom 
Shang v. Hoiley, 435 U.S. 947 (1978). That analysis is still 
appropriate. Holley continues to be the leading case on this 
issue and has been cited with approval throughout the country. 
In addition to this Court in Antillon, there are other 
state courts which have not required affirmative acts or policy 
of the INS in upholding or granting benefits to claimants. In 
these cases courts have found "color of law" when the INS had 
notice of an alienfs presence but had taken no steps to deport 
that alien. See Rubio y. Employment Division, 674 P.2d 120 
(Or. App. 1984); Cruz y. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 395 
Mass. 107, 478 N.E.2d 1262 (1985); St^ Francis Hospital y. 
D'elia, 71 A.D. 2d 110, 422 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1979). 
Respondent calls to this Court's attention a few federal 
cases which construe the term "under color of law", as well as 
a program letter which offers a U.S. Department of Labor 
interpretation of "color of law" for Federal Unemployment 
Tax Act (FUTA) purposes. However: 
Because of the nature of the relationship 
between FUTA and state law, federal 
interpretations of FUTA have a limited 
effect. The only binding federal 
decision would be a United States Supreme 
Court decision on the interpretation or 
constitutionality of the Federal law. 
Lower federal decisions does (sic) not 
relieve this court of the responsibility 
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to interpret the statutory test under 
state law. "(A) state supreme court does 
have to reach a final decision as to the 
state law that seeks to take advantage of 
the disputed federal statute." (cite 
omitted) 
Gillar v. Employment Division, 717 P.2d 131, 135 n. 6 (Or. 
1986). It is emphatically the place of the state Supreme Court 
to declare what the state law is, as this Court did in 
Antillon. Its decision in Antillon is controlling over 
Respondent. Respondent is obliged to obey Utah state law, and 
show deference to this Court's interpretation of the law. 
C. RESPONDENT'S POSITION FAILS TO SATISFY THIS 
COURT'S STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As Respondent recites, the standard of review which this 
Court has adopted when reviewing the Commission's 
interpretation of general questions of law is a 
"correction-of-error" standard. Salt Lake City Corporation v. 
Department of Employment Security, 657 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1982); 
Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service 
Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983); McPhie v. Industrial 
Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977). The Commission's 
construction of a statute remains subject to judicial review 
for consistency with the governing legislation and prior 
decisions of the court. Bayle v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d 
1135 (Utah 1985). 
Under this standard of review, the Board of Review plainly 
abused its authority through its non-acquiescence in the 
Antillon decision and its substitution of its own 
interpretation of §35-4-5(k) for that of the Court. 
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Respondent's construction of the statute is patently 
inconsistent with the Antillon opinion, and should be rejected. 
D. PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO BENEFITS 
The action of the Board of Review was directly opposed to 
Utah state law as enunciated in Antillon. Petitioner was 
entitled to unemployment benefits as an alien "permanently 
residing in the United States under color of law." The facts 
of this case cannot be distinguished from the facts in Antillon 
for the relevant times in questions. Once Petitioner made 
himself and his presence known to INS officials, he was 
residing in this country under color of law. Action taken by 
INS after the time that Petitioner applied for benefits does 
not retroactively negate Petitioner's presence under color of 
law. 
Petitioner was in the United States under color of law at 
all relevant times to his claim for unemployment benefits. He 
is not asking for welfare, but for the benefits he worked for, 
from the benefit pool his employer paid into during his base 
period. An award of benefits to the Petitioner will not open 
the floodgates to a tide of illegal immigrants; the standard 
will remain narrowed to aliens permanently residing in the 
United States under color of law. An award of benefits will be 
consistent with the fair dealing implicit in the idea of due 
process. Petitioner has worked and participated in paying into 
the unemployment insurance system. §35-4-5(k) is in place to 
deal with his claim. The precedent of Antillon is in place to 
ensure his right to seek benefits. Justice demands that 
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Petitioner be awarded the benefits for which he has worked, and 
for which he was eligible at the time of his application. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board of 
Review should be reversed and unemployment benefits should be 
awarded to the Petitioner. 
DATED this 14th day of July, 1986. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
/jAisn-t. fCcfJL 
BY: WAINE RICHES 
T: BRUCE PLENK / ^ 
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„v «/*«* picas over tne general 
public. 
(b) Pleading by respondent The spe-
cial inquiry officer shall require the 
respondent to plead to the order to 
show cause by stating whether he 
admits or denies the factual allega-
tions and his deportability under the 
charges contained therein. If the re-
spondent admits the factual allega-
tions and admits his deportability 
under the charges and the special in-
quiry officer is satisfied that no issues 
of law or fact remain, the special in-
quiry officer may determine that de-
portability as charged has been estab-
lished by the admissions of the re-
spondent. The special inquiry officer 
shall not accept an admission of de-
portability from an unrepresented re-
spondent who is incompetent or under 
age 16 and is not accompanied by a 
guardian, relative, or friend; nor from 
in officer of an institution In which a 
respondent is an inmate or patient. 
IVhen, pursuant to this paragraph, the 
ipecial inquiry officer may not accept 
m admission of deportability, he shall 
lirect a hearing on the issues, 
(c) Issues of deportability. When de« 
>ortability is not determined under 
he provisions of paragraph (b) of this 
ection, the special inquiry officer 
hall request the assignment of a trial 
ttorney, and shall receive evidence as 
> any unresolved issues, except that 
0 further evidence need be received 
» to any facts admitted during the 
leading. 
(d) Additional charges. A trial attor-
jy who has been assigned to a case 
ay at any time during a hearing 
dge additional charges of deportabil-
rt including factual allegations 
ainst the respondent. The additional 
stual allegations and charges shall 
submitted in writing and entered as 
exhibit in the record. The special 
juiry officer shall read the addition-
factual allegations and charges to 
5 respondent and explain them to 
n in nontechnical language. The 
cial inquiry officer shall advise the 
pondent if he is not represented by 
nsel that he may be so represented 
1 also that he may have a reasona-
time within which to meet the ad-
.^Ko»iucnt snail oe re-
quired to state then and there wheth-
er he desires a continuance for either 
of these reasons. Thereafter, the pro-
visions of paragraph (b) of this section 
shall apply to the additional factual 
allegations and lodged charges. 
C27 FR 9646, Sept. 29, 1962, as amended at 
29 PR 13243, Sept. 24, 1964; 32 FR 9632, 
July 4, 1967; 44 FR 4654, Jan. 23. 19793 
§ 242.17 Ancillary matters, applications. 
(a) Creation of the status of an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence. The respondent may apply to 
the special inquiry officer for suspen-
sion of deportation under section 
244(a) of the Act, for adjustment of 
status under section 245 of the Act, or 
under section 1 of the Act of Novem-
ber 2, 1966, or under section 101 or 104 
of the Act of October 28, 1977, or for 
creation of a record of lawful admis-
sion for permanent residence under 
section 214(d) or 249 of the Act; such 
application shall be subject to the re-
quirements contained in Parts 244, 
245, and 249 of this chapter. In con-
junction with such applications, if the 
respondent is inadmissible under any 
provision of section 212(a) of the Act 
and believes he meets the eligibility 
requirements for a waiver of the 
ground of inadmissibility, he may 
apply to the special inquiry officer for 
such waiver. The special inquiry offi-
cer shall inform the respondent of his 
apparent eligibility to apply for any of 
the benefits enumerated in this para-
graph and shall afford him an oppor-
tunity to make application therefor 
during the hearing. In exercising dis-
cretionary power when considering an 
application under this paragraph, the 
special inquiry officer may consider 
and base his decision on information 
not contained in the record and not 
made available for inspection by the 
respondent, provided the Commission-
er has determined that such informa-
tion is relevant and is classified under 
Executive Order No. 12356 (47 FR 
14874; April 6, 1982) as requiring pro-
tection from unauthorized disclosure 
in the interest of national security. 
Whenever he believes he can do so 
consistently with safeguarding both 
Exhibit 4 (pcige 1) 
special inquiry officer should inform 
the respondent of the general nature 
of the information in order that the 
respondent may have an opportunity 
to offer opposing evidence. A decision 
based in whole or in part on such clas-
sified information shall state that the 
information is material to the deci-
sion. 
(b) Voluntary departure. The re-
spondent may apply to the special in-
quiry officer for voluntary departure 
in lieu of deportation pursuant to sec-
tion 244(e) of the Act and Part 244 of 
this chapter. 
(c) Temporary withholding of depor-
tation. The special inquiry officer 
shall notify the respondent that if he 
is finally ordered deported his depor-
tation will in the first instance be di-
rected pursuant to section 243(a) of 
the Act to the country designated by 
him and shall afford the respondent 
an opportunity then and there to 
make such designation. The special in-
quiry officer shall then specify and 
state for the record the country, or 
countries in the alternate, to which re-
spondent's deportation will be directed 
pursuant to section 243(a) of the Act if 
the country of his designation will not 
accept him into its territory, or fails to 
furnish timely notice of acceptance, or 
the respondent declines to designate a 
country. The respondent shall be ad-
vised that pursuant to section 243(h) 
of the Act he may apply for tempo-
rary withholding of deporation to the 
country or countries specified by the 
special inquiry officer and may be 
granted not more than ten days in 
which to submit his application. The 
application shall consist of respond-
ent's statement setting forth the rea-
sons in support of his request. The re-
spondent shall be examined under 
oath on his application and may pre-
sent such pertinent evidence or infor-
mation as he has readily available. 
The respondent has the burden of sat-
isfying the special inquiry officer that 
he would be subject to persecution on 
account of race, religion, or political 
opinion as claimed. The trial attorney 
may also present evidence or informa-
tion for the record, and he may submit 
information not of record to be consid-
ered by the special inquiry officer pro-
or the Board has determined that 
such information is relevant and is 
classified under Executive Order No. 
12356 (47 FR 14874; April 6, 1982) as 
requiring protection from unauthor-
ized disclosure in the interest of na-
tional security. When the special in-
quiry officer receives such non-record 
information he shall inform the re-
spondent thereof and shall also inform 
him whether it concerns conditions* 
generally in a specified country or the 
respondent himself. Whenever he be-
lieves he can do so consistently with 
safeguarding both the information 
and its source, the special inquiry offi-
cer should state more specifically the 
general nature of the information in 
order that the respondent may have 
an opportunity to offer opposing evi-
dence. A decision based in whole or in 
part on such classified information 
shall state that such information is 
material to the decision. 
(d) Application for relief under sec-
tion 241(f). The respondent may apply 
to the immigration judge for relief 
from deportation under section 241(f) 
of the Act. 
(e) General An application under 
this section shall be made only during 
the hearing and shall not be held to 
constitute a concession of alienage or 
deportability in any case in which the 
respondent does not admit his alien-
age or deportability. The respondent 
shall have the burden of establishing 
that he is eligible for any requested 
benefit or privilege and that it should 
be granted in the exercise of discre-
tion. The respondent shall not be re-
quired to pay a fee on more than one 
application within paragraphs (a) and 
(c) of this section, provided that the 
minimum fee imposed when more 
than one application is made shall be 
determined by the cost of the applies 
tion with the highest fee. Nothir 
contained herein is intended to fort 
close the respondent from applying 
for any benefit or privilege which he 
believes himself eligible to receive in 
proceedings under this part. 
(Title I of Pub. L. 95-145 enacted Oct. 28, 
1977 (91 Stat. 1223). sec. 103 of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1103). 
Interpret or apply sees. 101, 212, 242 and 245 
(8 U.S.C. 1101, 1182, 1252 and 1255); sees. 
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243.1 Final order of deportation. 
Except as otherwise required by sec-
ion 242(c) of the Act for the specific 
mrposes of that section, an order of 
leportation. including an alternate 
>rder of deportation coupled with an 
>rder of voluntary departure, made by 
,he special inquiry officer in proceed-
ngs under Part 242 of this chapter 
shall become final upon dismissal of 
m appeal by the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals, upon waiver of appeal, 
ar upon expiration of the time allotted 
for an appeal when no appeal is taken; 
or. if such an order is issued by the 
Board or approved by the Board upon 
certification, it shall be final as of the 
date of the Board's decision. 
§ 243.2 Warrant of deportation. 
A warrant of deportation based upon 
the final administrative order of de-
portation in the alien's case shall be 
issued by a district director. The dis-
trict director shall exercise the au-
thority contained in section 243 of the 
Act to determine at whose expense the 
alien shall be deported and whether 
his mental or physical condition re-
quires personal care and attendance 
en route to his destination. 
§ 243.3 Expulsion. 
Once an order of deportation be-
comes final, an alien, not in the physi-
cal custody of the Service, shall be 
given not less than 72 hours advance 
notice in writing of the time and place 
of his surrender for deportation. If the 
alien fails to surrender as directed, he 
shall be deported without further 
notice when located, w n e u un ancn is 
directed to surrender for deportation, 
he shall do so notwithstanding the 
filing of an application for a stay of 
deportation unless he has been in-
formed prior to the surrender date 
that a stay has been granted. The ad-
vance notice requirement above does 
not preclude taking an alien into cus-
tody at any time, including any time 
within the 72 hour period, if his being 
at large constitutes a danger to public 
safety or security, or the district direc-
tor has reason to believe the alien is 
likely to abscond, or if information is 
received that the alien is likely to ab-
scond. However, in such an instance, 
the alien's deportation shall not be ef-
fected prior to the expiration of 72 
hours from the time of apprehension 
or of the 72 hour notice period, which-
ever is less. An alien shall be taken 
into custody prior to the time speci-
fied in the surrender notice only pur-
suant to an order by an official em-
powered under § 242.2(a) of this chap-
ter to issue warrants of arrest. 
[41 FR 38758. Sept. 13, 19761 
§ 243.4 Stay of deportation. 
Any request of an alien under a final 
administrative order of deportation 
for a stay of deportation, except a re-
quest for withholding of deportation 
pursuant to section 243(h) of the Act, 
shall be filed on Form 1-246 with the 
district director having jurisdiction 
over the place where the alien is at 
the time of filing. The district direc-
tor, in his discretion, may grant a stay 
of deportation for such time and 
under such conditions as he may deem 
appropriate. Written notice of the dis-
position of the alien's request shall be 
served upon him and any notice of 
denial shall include specific reasons 
therefor; however, neither the making 
of the request nor the failure to re-
ceive notice of disposition of the re-
quest shall relieve the alien from strict 
compliance with any outstanding 
notice to surrender for deportation. 
Denial by the district director of a re-
quest for a stay is not appealable but 
such denial shall not preclude the 
Board from granting a stay in connec-
tion with a motion to reopen or a 
motion to reconsider as provided in 
Cx/h-iK-i4- A / n a n a ?) 
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preclude the special inquiry officer, tn 
his discretion, from granting a stay in 
connection with, and pending his de-
termination of, a motion to reopen or 
a motion to reconsider a case falling 
within his jurisdiction pursuant to 
§ 242.22 of this chapter, and also pend-
ing an appeal from such determina-
tion. 
[40 FR 50702. Oct. 31. 19751 
§ 243.5 Self-deportation. 
A district director may permit an 
alien ordered deported to depart at his 
own expense to a destination of his 
own choice. Any alien who has depart-
ed from the United States while an 
order of deportation is outstanding 
shall be considered to have been de-
ported in pursuance of law, except 
that an alien who departed before the 
expiration of the voluntary departure 
time granted in connection with an al-
ternate order of deportation shall not 
be considered to have been so deport-
ed. 
[29 FR 6485, May 19, 19641 
§ 243.6 Notice to transportation line. 
When a transportation line is re-
sponsible for the expenses of an alien's 
deportation, notification shall be made 
to such line on Form 1-284, when ap-
plicable, and Form 1-288. If special 
care and attention is required, notifi-
cation to this effect shall be placed on 
Form 1-288. 
§ 243.7 Special care and attention for 
aliens. 
When a transportation line is re-
sponsible for the expenses of an alien's 
deportation, the alien shall be deliv-
ered to the master, commanding offi-
cer, or the officer in charge of the 
vessel or aircraft on which the alien 
will be deported, who shall be given 
Forms 1-287, I-287A, and I-287B. The 
reverse of Form I-287A shall be signed 
by the officer of the vessel or aircraft 
to whom the alien has been delivered 
and immediately returned to the im-
migration officer effecting delivery. 
Form I-287B shall be retained by the 
receiving officer and subsequently 
filled out by the agents or persons 
therein designated and returned by 
shall at its own expense forward the 
alien from the foreign port of disem-
barkation to the final destination 
specified on Form 1-287. The special 
care and attention shall be continued 
to such final destination, except when 
the foreign public officers decline to 
allow such attendant to proceed and 
themselves take charge of the alien, in 
which case this fact shall be recorded 
by the transportation line on the re-
verse of Form I-287B. If the transpor-
tation line fails, refuses, or neglects to 
provide the necessary special care and 
attention or comply with the direc 
tions of Form 1-287, the district direc 
tor shall thereafter and without notict 
employ suitable persons, at the ex 
pense of the transportation line, an< 
effect such deportation. 
§ 243.8 Imposition of sanctions. 
The provisions of section 243(g) c 
the Act have been applied to residenl 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist R 
publics, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, ar 
Cuba. These provisions do not apply 1 
an alien who is residing in Estoni 
Latvia, or Lithuania who is not a n 
tional, citizen, or subject of the Uni< 
of Soviet Socialist Republics. The 
provisons also do not apply to an all 
who is residing in Cuba and can 
classified as an immediate relative 
defined in section 201(b) or a retui 
ing resident as defined in secti 
101(a)(27)(A). The sanctions impos 
on residents of the Union of Soviet! 
cialist Republics, Czechoslovakia, s 
Hungary pursuant to section 243 
may be waived in an individual c 
for the beneficiary of a petition 
corded a status under section 20Kb 
section 203(a) of the Act. The SJ 
tions upon the USSR, Czechoslovs 
and Hungary may be waived upon 
individual request by the Departir 
of State in behalf of a visa applic 
Upon approval of a visa petitior 
upon an individual request by the 
partment of State in behalf of a 
applicant, the district director s 
determine whether sanctions sha! 
waived. However, the regional com 
sioner or the Deputy Commissic 
may direct that any case or chit 
IP'.* 
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